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HIV AND INCOME INEQUALITY:  
IF THERE IS A LINK, WHAT DOES IT TELL US? 
Göran Holmqvist
 ∗  
ABSTRACT 
There is a striking variation in the prevalence of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) among 
countries and regions of the world, with a distinct geographical pattern. This paper explores the 
link between income inequality and HIV. It presents empirical evidence—a meta-study and 
additional cross-country regression results—that clearly support the argument that such a link 
exists. The interpretation of this link is an open issue. Four different hypotheses are discussed, 
each one pointing out a transit route from income inequality to HIV. The paper presents 
preliminary evidence on these routes and identifies potential areas for future research.  
1  POINTS OF DEPARTURE 
The global HIV prevalence map reveals striking contrasts between high-prevalence and low- 
prevalence countries. Africa is clearly the most affected continent, but within Africa there is a 
distinct geographical pattern (see Figure 1). A handful of southern African countries have 
prevalence indicators of between 15 and 35 per cent, while the western parts of Africa are 
within the range of 1 to 5 per cent. A few countries in eastern Africa are in an intermediate 
position, with rates of between 3 and 7 per cent (together with Ivory Coast in the west). 
Outside Africa, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has not reported 
prevalence above 4 per cent for any country, but each continent seems to have its 
geographical HIV pattern. In the Western Hemisphere, the highest levels are found in countries 
in the Caribbean Basin (Haiti, Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Guyana, Suriname and 
Honduras, where rates are between 1.5 and 3.8 per cent). In Asia, the highest prevalence rates 
have been reported for Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar, where rates are 
at 1.4 to 1.8 per cent. In Europe, a group of eastern European countries are the most affected 
(Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova and Russia, with rates of 1.1 to 1.4 per cent).  
How is this variation in HIV rates to be explained? One might expect that with such a 
striking variation, particularly within Africa, it should be fairly easy to identify a distinct set of 
explanatory factors. The question demands an answer not only because it may offer some 
clues about the HIV epidemic and how to counteract it.1 More generally, it may also reveal why 
some societies are more vulnerable than others to “new” infectious diseases—diseases that are 
expected to increase as a by-product of globalisation.  
The issue has been debated, of course, but the results seem far from conclusive and 
interpretation of the evidence is still open to discussion. Several studies point out the link 
between HIV and income inequality. A purely statistical correlation is clearly present (see 
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Figure 2). Can this link between income inequality and HIV prevalence be shown to be 
significant and robust? If so, why are less equal societies more vulnerable to HIV?  




The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of what seem  
to be frequent and influential explanations of why HIV prevalence is so much higher in  
some countries and regions than others. Section 3 is a meta-study reviewing the results of a 
collection of recent analyses that have used cross-country regression techniques to explain 
variations in HIV prevalence. In Section 4, cross-country regressions similar to those presented 
in Section 3 are repeated, using data collected for the purpose of this study but altering the 
model specifications and samples. Some of the results are replicated, among them the 
significant relationship between income inequality and HIV; other links that have been 
reported as significant do not appear to be robust. Section 5 discusses the possible pathways 
from income inequality to HIV, and presents four alternative “stories”. Each of them is 
confronted with some preliminary empirical evidence, and some areas for future research  
are identified. Section 6 presents the conclusions. Working Paper  3 
 
FIGURE 2 
Income Distribution (GINI) and HIV Prevalence (LOGHIV), Global Sample     
 
Source: See Annex 1. 
2  CHIEF EXPLANATIONS OF THE VARIATION IN HIV PREVALENCE 
ACROSS COUNTRIES AND REGIONS  
The potential determinants of HIV prevalence in a society are located along a complex causal 
chain involving various spheres that often interact. The links between HIV and different 
potential determinants in a given society may be portrayed as in Table 1, which is adapted 
from Barnett and Whiteside (2006).  
TABLE 1 
Determinants 
Distal determinants  Proximal determinants 








Access to healthcare 
Levels of violence 
Women’s rights 
Rate of partner change 
Concurrent partners 




State of infection 
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What are the most important drivers among these potential determinants?  
A (still incomplete) review of the literature identifies the following four factors as those  
most frequently cited. 
Male circumcision. There is an apparent correlation between HIV prevalence and male 
circumcision in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). There has been a debate about whether this reflects 
the impact of religion and social norms rather than the impact of circumcision on the 
transmission rate of the virus. Nonetheless, there seems to be convincing biological and 
epidemiological evidence (such as from trials with control groups) that circumcision does 
indeed provide some protection against HIV (Halperin and Epstein, 2007). UNAIDS has taken a 
clear stand in favour of circumcision in its recommendations (UNAIDS, 2007). Of course, this 
does not preclude the consideration that the statistical correlation stems to some extent  
from behavioural factors related to culture, religion, norms and historical legacies. Note also 
that circumcision cannot explain why HIV rates in southern Africa are so much higher than 
those in other regions of the world, such as India, Latin America and Europe, where 
circumcision is equally uncommon or even less common.  
Social cohesion/social capital. Barnett and Whiteside (2006) present a theory whereby 
social cohesion is a key variable that defines different societies’ susceptibility to HIV. The basic 
idea is that socially cohesive societies are better able to mobilise resources in pursuit of joint 
goals to avoid or control risk. The establishment of trust and shared norms facilitates the 
collective action needed. It is assumed that social inequality undermines social capital, and 
there is a good deal of empirical evidence supporting that claim. A social cohesion-HIV theory 
has its echo in different fields of the social sciences, such as public health (Wilkinson, 1996), the 
sociology of crime (Sampson and Groves, 1989), and theories on democracy and governance 
(Putnam, 2000).  
Concurrent partnerships. The empirical evidence does not support the suggestion that 
Africans on average have more sexual partners during their lifetimes than do, for example, 
Americans. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case. It is claimed, however, that the 
phenomena of multiple, long-term, concurrent partnerships is more common in Africa than 
elsewhere. Modelling has shown that the spread of HIV in a population is much higher in a 
system of long-term, concurrent relationships than with the serial-monogamy form of 
relationships common in the West, since concurrency leads to widespread sexual networks 
through which HIV may be more easily transmitted. The fact that infectivity is higher in the first 
weeks after infection, and that condom use is less frequent in long-term partnerships, gives 
additional force to this mechanism. Polygamy is a form of concurrent partnership but will not 
lead to the same kind of extensive sexual networks unless women also engage in multiple,  
long-term relationships. This is less likely to be the case in the Muslim countries of northern and 
western Africa, where polygamy is common but women’s sexual behaviour tends to be strictly 
controlled; this may explain why these parts of Africa are less affected. In essence, these are the 
elements of the theory of concurrent partnerships (Halperin and Epstein, 2007). It has been 
described as the “hottest explanation of the high rates in [Sub-Saharan Africa]” (Beegle and Özler, 
2006). An income inequality link has also been identified here, since there is often an element of 
transactional sex in these concurrent relationships, and economic inequalities overlapping with 
gender and age inequalities may provide fertile ground (Leclerc-Madlala, 2004).  
Colonial legacy. The disorganisation of family structures and social norms—a by-product 
of white settlements, the resettlement of Africans and forced or “voluntary” labour migration—Working Paper  5 
 
is often mentioned as an important background factor in Africa’s HIV crisis (Setel et al., 1999; 
Hargrove, 2007; Barnett and Whiteside, 2006; Brummer, 2002). A glance at the HIV map also 
reveals that the high-prevalence countries in Africa tend to be those where whites settled in 
greater numbers and where large-scale commercial farming, and particularly the mining 
industry (and apartheid in general), had a far-reaching impact on labour migration and family 
patterns. This produced dual economies and unequal societies, and did so more in southern 
and eastern Africa than elsewhere.  
The vast literature on HIV and AIDS, of course, includes several additional suggestions as 
to why Africa is special and why southern Africa is so special within Africa. Economists using 
utility maximisation models of sexual behaviour have argued that poverty, which entails 
higher mortality risks due to a number of causes, makes people less inclined to engage in risk-
reducing behaviour. This has been offered as an explanation of why sexual behaviour changed 
quickly among the US gay community as risk became apparent, while the change does not 
seem to have taken place in Africa (Oster, 2007). Traditional sexual practices are also 
mentioned sometimes as contributing to the spread of HIV. Others have argued that the  
focus on sexual behaviour is misleading in explaining high African HIV prevalence indicators.  
In addition to male circumcision, both cofactor infections (such as untreated sexually 
transmitted diseases [STDs], parasites or malaria) that increase susceptibility to the virus 
(Sawers et al., 2008) and unsafe healthcare (Broody and Deutchert, 2007) have been pointed 
out as important determinants.  
Moreover, it is often claimed that the causes of the HIV epidemic are multiple and highly 
context-specific, sometimes linked to development and wealth, sometimes to poverty and 
backwardness, sometimes to armed conflicts, trade routes and specific processes of social 
change. Hence there may be limitations on the space available for the kind of generalisation 
involved in regression analysis. However, claiming that determinants are exclusively local and 
context-specific would be difficult to reconcile with the distinct geographical pattern revealed 
by the global HIV map.  
The literature is thus rich in possible explanations, all based on causal mechanisms that 
sound more or less plausible. Some of these explanations are potentially compatible with  
each other, in the sense that they may be parts of the same causal chain (for instance, social 
cohesion as a determinant of certain behaviours). Others must be seen as alternative 
explanations, and it would be helpful if their respective weights were resolved.   
3  A META-STUDY OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE FROM  
CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSIONS  
There are a number of reasons why evidence from cross-country regressions should be 
interpreted with care. Several caveats should be kept in mind, such as measurement 
problems, the “omission of relevant variable” bias, and uncertain directions of causality. 
Furthermore, it is rarely known whether all the critical underlying statistical assumptions are 
fulfilled. Statistical relations are not necessarily causal, and a causal link does not necessarily 
indicate what the relevant intervention should be. As mentioned above, moreover, 
generalising may have serious limitations because a causal link in one context may not be 
present in another. These reservations should be kept in mind as we proceed. Whatever  6  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
can be learned from cross-country regressions should be seen as one piece of evidence  
to be combined with evidence from other sources.  
Table A1 in Annex 3 gives the results of some recent studies of the determinants of HIV 
prevalence that have used some form of cross-country regression technique (this is not to 
claim that all relevant studies have been identified). They are thus limited to ecological studies 
(that is, the unit of observation is a population); studies that seek to explain the variation in HIV 
status among individuals have not been included. The studies are by scholars from different 
disciplines. Some have been published in journals and others are working papers. They vary 
substantially in quality and technical sophistication, though this does not seem to be 
determined by whether or not they have been published. The studies were carried out using 
different samples: global, developing countries only, SSA countries only, and some samples 
consisting of provinces/states within countries (the United States, China and Russia). Most 
studies derive from a model with a set of basic explanatory variables (typically GDP per capita 
and some measures of poverty, income inequality, urbanisation, and the percentage of 
Muslims in the total population); some specific variable, the main focus of the study, is then 
added. Only a few of these studies focused specifically on the HIV-income inequality link; 
rather, they have stumbled on that link while the focus has been on other issues.  
Table A1 shows the main theme of the study, the sample, how the independent variable 
was defined (typically the LOG HIV-prevalence),2 and the explanatory variables reported. 
Variables reported as significant in the study (at the 5 per cent level) are in bold. This is subject 
to some interpretation because most studies report on results from different model 
specifications, and thus the significance may vary. The last column makes some comments to 
qualify the results, as well as some remarks on findings related to income inequality. The result 
of the meta-study presented in Table A1 may be summarised as follows: 
•  Among the variables that appear in several studies, only two (in addition to 
regional dummies) can be described as consistently significant: income inequality 
and percentage of Muslims in the population. It is noteworthy that income 
inequality is significant in different model specifications, in global and SSA-only 
samples, as well as in some subnational studies (states/provinces in the United 
States and China).  
•  Some studies have applied regional dummies (SSA or southern Africa). Where they 
have been used they have remained highly significant, indicating that something 
is left unexplained. Sawers et al. (2008) is an exception to some extent. 
•  Results are inconsistent for a number of variables. Among them are the indicators 
related to per capita income, poverty, urbanisation, gender and ethnic 
fractionalisation, which have been reported as significant in some studies but not in 
others. Inconsistency may be the result of different model specifications and samples. 
•  Indicators of sexual behaviour, undeniably a key factor of interest in relation to the 
spread of HIV and AIDS, are largely absent from these studies. There are limitations 
in terms of the available indicators (leading to small samples), as well as problems of 
reverse causality, which limit their usefulness. One study has used median age at 
first sex for females in a global 45-country sample (reported as significant). Another 
study reports commercial sex workers/population as a significant variable. Working Paper  7 
 
•  Only one study, applied to US states, used indicators of social capital  
(Holtgrave and Crosby, 2003) and this variable emerged as significant. 
 
4  REPLICATING AND REFUTING RESULTS 
Table A2 in Annex 3 reports on a series of experiments with regressions that to varying 
degrees correspond to those presented in Section 3 and Table A1, but in which model 
specifications and samples have been altered. The purpose is to check whether the 
significant results of previous studies may be replicated in a straightforward ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, and to obtain some indications of their robustness. This will also 
shed light on some of the inconsistencies among the results as revealed by the meta-study. 
The data used have been collected specifically for the purpose of this study (Annex 1 gives 
data sources and definitions).  
As in most of the studies reported in Table A1, the logarithm of HIV prevalence among 
adults aged 15–49 (UNAIDS data for 2005) is used. We depart from a basic model with five 
variables: income inequality (measured by average Gini coefficients over three decades); level 
of economic development (measured by log of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, or 
PPP); a poverty measure (adult literacy); urbanisation (measured by urban population growth 
1990–1995); and  percentage of the population that is Muslim. Since it might be expected that 
income inequality could affect HIV though income and/or poverty, it was essential to keep 
these two variables in the basic model. Urban growth was used rather than urban dwellers  
as a share of the population, since it fits better with any theory emphasising social change/ 
migration/mobility as a factor contributing to HIV (in bivariate analysis it also reveals  
a higher degree of correlation with HIV than urban share of the population). 
Are problems of reverse causality reasonably under control in this basic model?  
HIV may obviously affect poverty levels, but the choice of literacy as a poverty indicator has the 
advantage that it has some built-in lags (literacy reflects historical poverty levels), which should 
mean that it is largely unaffected by present HIV levels. HIV may also affect income inequality, 
and the literature discusses the direction of that impact. Nonetheless, the Gini coefficients used 
here are based on averages for the last three decades (using a dataset provided by William 
Easterly; see Annex 1), which to some extent should lessen concerns about reverse causality. 
The impact of HIV on GDP is also discussed widely in the literature, and estimates of that 
impact differ considerably—see Glick (2007) for an overview. Reverse causality in relation to 
GDP per capita could be addressed using lagged variables or instrumental variable techniques. 
Tsafack Temah (2008, table 4.5) takes the latter approach  without much impact on the overall 
results, at least as regards income inequality. We refrain from complicating the regressions 
here, and simply use log of GDP per capita. With respect to the percentage of Muslims in the 
population and urban growth in the period 1990–1995, it seems reasonable to assume that 
they are exogenous. 
To this model we successively add several of the indicators used in previous studies. 
Variables reflecting sexual behaviour and social capital, where reverse causality is likely to be 
more problematic, are left for discussion in Section 5.  8  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
The large sample consists of all developing countries for which data are available  
(for a list of the countries, see Annex 1). In some cases, results are also reported for SSA only 
and for not-SSA samples. The results are grouped into sections, each of which seeks to shed 
light on a specific issue. Significant coefficients are in bold. In several cases, the significance of 
the variables is entirely dependent on the non-inclusion of a dummy variable for Africa. These 
are labelled non-robust, since their explanatory power seems to be exclusively the product of 
the overall variation in HIV levels between Africa and the rest of the world. Comments on the 
results of each section are given below.  
ROUNDS 1–5. BASIC MODEL 
The first five rounds replicate what seems to be a generalised finding from the meta-study: 
income inequality and percentage of Muslims are significant. This is the case with or without  
a SSA dummy and in the SSA-only sample, as well in the not-SSA sample. Significance falls 
slightly below the 5 per cent level in the SSA-only sample when a dummy for southern African 
countries is included. 
The adult literacy indicator, which is reported as significant in some cases in the meta-
study, is significant only in the large sample, with no dummy included. Africa has a high HIV 
prevalence and low levels of literacy, a circumstance that gives the literacy indicator some 
explanatory force. When a dummy is included, however, or when the sample is divided into 
SSA and not-SSA subsamples, this indicator loses its significance. 
ROUNDS 6–9. ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES 
Rounds 6–9 replace literacy by Poverty < 1USD. This reduces the sample size because of data 
availability, but Poverty < 1USD behaves more or less like the literacy variable: it is significant in 
the large sample but loses its significance when a regional dummy is included. Unreported  
in Table A2, tests were also carried out with some alternative poverty measures, such as access 
to an improved water source, with similar results. 
A tentative conclusion is that HIV is not robustly related to poverty. Africa is poor and  
has high HIV prevalence, but neither within Africa nor among the non-African developing 
countries does poverty emerge as being significantly related to HIV.  
A second tentative conclusion is that the link between income inequality and HIV is not 
intermediated by poverty. The beta coefficient of the Gini variable remains significant and 
largely unaffected when these different poverty measures are added to the equation. 
ROUNDS 10–18. GENDER INEQUALITY MEASURES 
Various gender-related variables are tested: female/male literacy; the gender power index of 
the United Nations Development Programme’s human development index (HDI) rank minus 
gender-related development index (GDI) rank; and contraceptive use by married women. They 
are significant in some of the rounds, but again the significance is entirely dependent on the 
non-inclusion of a dummy variable for Africa, and in the case of female/male literacy it is also 
dependent on the non-inclusion of general literacy level. This could explain the inconsistency 
in some of the meta-study results in the area of gender inequality, where at least some models 
appear to suffer from the “omission of relevant variable” bias.  Working Paper  9 
 
ROUNDS 19–21. ETHNIC FRACTIONALISATION 
Ethnic fractionalisation is another variable with inconsistent results in the meta-study. It is 
significant in the large sample but loses all significance when an Africa dummy is included.  
It does not appear as significant in the SSA-only sample. Tsafack Temah (2008), with a more 
developed study, reached another conclusion for ethnic heterogeneity in an SSA-only sample.  
ROUNDS 22-23. AGE OF EPIDEMIC 
This indicator also has inconsistent results in the meta-study. The indicator is based on the first 
year an HIV case was reported. It is not significant in either of these rounds, but it comes closer 
to significance in the global sample without the dummy included (Africa’s epidemic was earlier 
than those in other developing countries).     
ROUNDS 24–29. MALE CIRCUMCISION 
Is the link between HIV and the Muslim share of the population an issue of male circumcision, 
of norms and sexual behaviour, or both? Islam is clearly associated with male circumcision.  
It is also sometimes claimed to be associated with less alcohol consumption and stricter marital 
codes, but also with polygamy and a rejection of condom use, which might work in the 
opposite direction as regards HIV (Gray, 2003).  
The meta-study identified few deliberate efforts to clarify this matter with quantitative 
analysis; Gray (2003) and Drain et al. (2006) are the most explicit attempts. Rounds 24–29 seek 
to shed some additional light on this issue (though the Islam-HIV link is not the main purpose 
of this paper). An advantage for the statistical analysis here is that the causal links should be 
straightforward: people do not become Muslim because of HIV or because they are 
circumcised. Moreover, at least until recently, people have been circumcised mainly for 
religious and cultural reasons and not because of the spread of HIV (this is likely to change  
in Africa after the UNAIDS recommendations and the introduction of new policies).  
Inaccurate data are likely to be of greater concern. It has been possible to identify two 
measures of male circumcision. Available for the global sample was a classification of all 
countries in three groups: below 20 per cent, above 80 per cent and intermediate This is 
labelled MC1. For the SSA countries it was possible to identify more precise male circumcision 
rates, labelled MC2 (see Annex 1 for sources).  
In the global sample without the SSA dummy (Round 24), male circumcision is not 
significant while the Muslim percentage of the population is. When an SSA dummy is added 
(Round 25), male circumcision is highly significant. Since African countries have comparatively 
high rates of male circumcision, this factor does not offer a strong explanation of the difference 
in HIV rates between Africa and the rest of the world. Nonetheless, allowing for a fixed effect 
for Africa (the dummy lets Africa have its own intercept), the result changes considerably. 
Then, male circumcision seems to add explanatory force in relation to the HIV pattern within 
Africa, but not to that between Africa and the rest of the world. In the SSA-only sample 
(Rounds 27–29), the use of both Muslim percentage of the population and male circumcision 
simultaneously, rather than successively, adds explanatory power to the equation (F-value up 
from 8.4 and 9.1 to 11.6). The two variables are clearly significant when combined. This may be 
interpreted as supporting the view that the Muslim factor has an effect on its own, one that is 
not expressed through male circumcision.  10  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS FROM REGRESSIONS AS PRESENTED IN TABLE A2 
•  As in the meta-analysis, two variables emerge as consistently significant  
(in addition to the regional dummies): the Muslim percentage of the population 
and income inequality. 
•  The income inequality variable behaves in a strikingly consistent manner, with a 
standardised coefficient at about 0.4 when the regional dummy is not included 
and 0.2 with the dummy. This variable apparently goes some way towards 
explaining why Africa is different and why there is a variation within (and 
outside) Africa. Income inequality’s impact on HIV does not appear to emerge 
through poverty. 
•  The findings suggest that Islam is a factor that is expressed through the male 
circumcision factor, as well as through its own independent effect. 
•  A number of variables seem to be subject to what might be called an African 
reverse correlation paradox—that is, they are positively related to HIV in a global 
sample but unrelated or even negatively related to HIV within Africa. In short, 
globally HIV is associated with underdevelopment and poverty, but within Africa 
the relation is rather the opposite. This explains some of the inconsistencies 
revealed by the meta-study. 
5  THE INEQUALITY-HIV LINK: WHICH THEORY DOES IT FIT? 
The results above, therefore, clearly indicate that there is a link between inequality and HIV. 
The link between income inequality and HIV is further explored in Tsafack Temah (2008), using 
panel data for 29 African countries in the period 1997–2005. That study applies far more 
rigorous testing procedures than those outlined above, and income inequality still remains 
one of the strongest predictors of HIV.  
While the income inequality-HIV link seems to have a relatively strong empirical support, 
its interpretation is more open to discussion. Why should there be such a link? Different 
hypotheses regarding the transit route from inequality to HIV may be constructed with 
elements from various disciplines of the social sciences. Four such hypotheses are described 
below. Figure 4 in Section 6 illustrates the position of these four hypotheses along the 
potential pathways from income inequality to HIV. Each of them has a disciplinary inspiration 
or affiliation, and to keep track of them here they have been labelled accordingly as the stories 
of the economist, the sociologist, the political economist and the historian.3 Scholars in these 
disciplines are asked not to feel implicated or offended by the use of these labels. The accounts 
below are deliberately termed “stories”, since it is not the aim of this exploratory paper to 
present fully developed and precise theories. For each story some preliminary evidence is 
presented, indicating possible areas for future research.   
5.1   THE ECONOMIST’S STORY: INCOME INEQUALITY LEADING TO HIV  
THROUGH THE ECONOMICS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOUR 
Just as with the economics of crime, in the tradition of Gary Becker—whereby crime is 
modelled as a rational choice by a utility-maximising individual weighing the benefit of the Working Paper  11 
 
loot against the risk of getting caught times the punishment—we may construct an economic 
theory of sexual behaviour. Oster (2007) uses such a model of sexual behaviour to explain why 
poor people would be less inclined to adjust their behaviour when facing the risk of HIV, and 
hence why, for instance, members of the US gay community rapidly changed their sexual 
conduct as HIV became known while adaptation seems to have been much slower in Africa.  
The intuition behind Oster’s idea is simple: utility is maximised by an individual over two 
periods, and the chance of surviving to period 2 is determined by the risk of being infected 
with HIV in period 1, as well as by other mortality risks not related to HIV. Poor people are more 
exposed to a high risk of dying for reasons unrelated to HIV, a circumstance that decreases the 
expected loss associated with the risk of being infected by HIV. Correspondingly, being richer 
and having fewer mortality risks means that an individual places greater value on his life in 
period 2, and thus is less inclined to put it at risk.  
Neither mentioned nor explicitly modelled in Oster’s article, but an extension that can 
be added, is that there would also be a link between income inequality and risky sexual 
conduct if there were an element of economic transaction involved (not necessarily 
understood as prostitution). This would correspond to how theories of the economics  
of crime predict a link between income inequality and crime. Again, the basic intuition is 
simple: a utility-maximising individual engages in transactional sex as a “seller” if the utility of 
the benefits (transactional sex income) outweighs the expected utility lost, which is partially 
determined by the risk of being infected and therefore not surviving to period 2. The 
marginal utility of income is higher the poorer people are, so the transactional sex income 
has greater weight in the utility function of the poor. Being poorer also entails a higher 
mortality risk due to factors other than AIDS in period 2, and hence a lower expected loss 
from being infected in period 1. More poverty thus leads to more people being ready to 
engage in risky behaviour. On the other hand, people engage in transactional sex as a 
“buyer” if the pleasure they derive from it outweighs the lost utility from it, which in this  
case is determined by the “price” for transactional sex plus the expected utility loss from 
increased risk of not surviving to period 2. For the rich there are two forces at play here: 
being richer and having a greater chance of surviving to period 2 reduces the inclination  
to take risks, but being richer also means being able to afford more transactional sex. With 
higher levels of income inequality, therefore, it is expected that more poor people are ready 
to engage in transactional sex for a given price, and perhaps also that more rich people are 
able and ready to enter the transactional sex market as buyers. Annex 2 presents a sketch of 
a formalised economic model of sexual behaviour that illustrates this point, extending 
Oster’s original model with the inclusion of a “transactional sex price”.   
As a portrayal of human behaviour this theory may appear crude and simplistic. Its basic 
elements, however, could easily be reconciled with the view that concurrent partnerships are a 
major driver of the HIV epidemic (see Section 2). Concurrent partnerships, not to be 
misunderstood as prostitution, are believed to contain varying degrees of transactional sex, 
the stereotype being the “sugar daddy” engaging in multiple partnerships with younger and 
economically dependent women (Leclerc-Madlala, 2004). Studies of the determinants of 
individual HIV status have also identified economic gender inequalities between young 
women and older/richer men as a clear risk factor (Beegle and Özler, 2006).  
What would it take to give the economist’s story empirical support in a cross-country 
analysis? To support it one would like to establish a link between income inequality and risky 12  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
sexual behaviour that involves some form of economic transaction, and between the latter and 
HIV. Determining the precise strength of the link between risk behaviour and HIV in ecological 
studies is demanding because of issues of both data availability and reverse causality.  
A number of studies have tried to establish the reverse link from HIV to behavioural change, 
and the methodological problems are recognised as challenging; for an overview, see Glick 
(2007: 28–34). It might be easier, however, to establish the link from income inequality to risky 
sexual behaviour, since income inequality could be seen as largely exogenous to sexual 
behaviour. Table 2 shows the partial correlations between income inequality and some 
indicators of risky sexual behaviour. Note that income inequality is positively correlated  
with most of these indicators of risk behaviour, and significantly so with some of them.  
TABLE 2 







1  0.47  25 
High-risk sex male  0.51  22 
First sex female age  - 0.36  50 
First sex male age  - 0.54  32 
Young female (15–24) having premarital sex last year  0.38  43 
Multiple partners female
2 0.20  29 
Multiple partners male   0.21  28 
Female commercial sex workers, prevalence  0.52  42 
Had commercial sex last year (males)  0.33  22 
Sample consists of developing countries, a substantial share of them in Africa. 
Significant correlations at 5% in bold. 
1.  High-risk sex defined as share of respondents (aged 15–49) who had sex with a non-marital and non-cohabiting 
partner during the previous 12 months. 
2.  Multiple partners defined as share of respondents (among sexually active aged 15–49) who had sex with more 
than one partner during the previous 12 months. 
Source: See Annex 1. 
 
Moving a step further to multivariate analysis, using the basic model from Table A2 but 
substituting HIV for an indicator of risk behaviour as a dependent variable, income inequality is 
confirmed as a significant predictor of the indicators of sexual risk behaviour. The results are 
reported in Table 3. Gini emerges as a significant explanatory variable for three of the four 
indicators of sexual risk behaviour, and is just below the 5 per cent significance level in the  
case of commercial sex worker prevalence.  
Establishing the link between income inequality and risky sexual behaviour more 
rigorously could be an area of useful future research. Even if the links in Table 3 could be 
established with greater certainty, however, it is still not clear if it supports the theory of the 
economist rather than some other theory. As revealed by Tables 2 and 3, income inequality 
seems to be associated with most of the measures of risky behaviour, not just with those that 
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The economist’s story, as presented here, is a theory that works solely on the assumption 
that each individual is a utility-maximising agent, without any references to social interaction, 
the creation of norms, stigma or public sector interventions. The sociologist’s story is different.  
TABLE 3 
Explaining Sexual Risk Behaviour with Variables of the Basic Model  




First sex  
female age 






Gini  -0.35 -0.50  0.29  0.26 
   -3.09  -2.63  2.23  1.83 
logGDP/cap -0.07  -0.15  -0.12  0.19 
   -0.66  -0.87 -0.91  1.48 
Adult literacy  0.45  0.14 0.06  0.14 
   2.75  0.48  0.25  0.51 
Urban growth  0.07  0.13  -0.06  0.38 
   0.51  0.63  -0.35  1.69 
% Muslim  0.14  0.15  -0.13  -0.15 
   1.12  0.70  -0.75  -1.18 
SSA dummy   -0.33  -0.01  0.64 0.53 
   -2.23  -0.06  3.79  2.62 
R2 0.47  0.16  0.35  0.51 
F-value 8.29  2.03  4.73  6.98 
N= 49  31  42  35 
5.2  THE SOCIOLOGIST’S STORY : INCOME INEQUALITY LEADING TO  
HIV THROUGH A REDUCTION IN SOCIAL CAPITAL 
There are numerous ways of defining social capital but the elements usually included in the 
definitions are trust, norms, reciprocity and cooperation among members of a social network, 
enabling collective action in pursuit of shared goal. It is often pointed out that social capital in 
a given society does not express itself in one dimension alone. Strong social capital within one 
sub-group does not necessarily reflect social capital in society as a whole (the example of the 
Mafia in Sicily may illustrate the point). Moreover, a distinction is often made between vertical 
and horizontal expressions of social capital (for instance, trusting the government versus 
trusting people in general).  
Various indicators have been used to measure social capital. In quantitative analysis, the 
most common are indicators of generalised trust: public surveys asking “in general, do you 
think most people can be trusted?” Other indicators used are measures of participation in 
different social networks, or groups and indicators reflecting vertical trust (trust in various 
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Barnett and Whiteside (2006), a frequently cited source on the AIDS epidemic, argues that 
there is a link between social cohesion/social capital and HIV. Socially cohesive societies are 
assumed to be better able to mobilise resources in pursuit of joint goals and to avoid  
or control risk. But what, more precisely, does “social capital” contain that would facilitate the 
mobilisation of collective action against HIV? Just as the concept of social capital is vague, a 
number of different links may be at work here. It could be a matter of establishing common 
norms in a community to uphold certain rules of sexual behaviour. It could also have 
something to do with shared values being lost as a result of social divides, and mutual support 
mechanisms being undermined. Or could it reflect the absence of vertical and horizontal 
relations of trust that are needed in a society to pass on a warning that leads to behavioural 
change? The vast literature on the relationship between social capital and public health in 
general is rich in suggestions for possible linkages (Kawachi et al., 1999).  
Is it possible to give empirical support to an income inequality-social capital-HIV link?  
The link between social capital and income inequality is quite well established empirically  
and reference is often made to it. A recent study, using a global sample, identified income 
inequality as one of the few determinants of generalised horizontal trust (as measured  
in the World Values Survey) that remained robust using various model specifications and  
tests (Bjornskov, 2006).  
The link between social capital and HIV is more problematic. As with sexual behaviour, the 
causal relationship is likely to work in both directions. Indeed, one of the few identified studies 
to have conducted cross-country regressions involving HIV and social capital (generalised 
trust) tries to determine the impact of HIV on social capital rather than the other way round 
(David, 2007). It concludes that there is such an impact, though it acknowledges having used 
an instrumental variable for HIV that is of dubious quality.4 Ecological studies based on US 
states have confirmed a social capital-HIV link. In South Africa, studies of the determinants  
of individuals’ HIV status have tested the social capital hypothesis, using indicators of 
membership of different kinds of groups and social networks; the results have been mixed, 
depending on the character of the group or network (Campbell et al., 2002).  
The World Values Survey is the most frequently used data source for the indicator of 
generalised trust—that is, the “most people can be trusted” question. A limitation of the World 
Values Survey is that it includes relatively few developing countries, particularly countries in 
Africa where there is the greatest variation in HIV prevalence. Trust is also measured by a 
similar question in the regional barometers (Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer and 
Asiabarometer), now combined under the heading of the Global Barometer. This has a sample 
of 38 developing countries (8 Asian, 17 Latin American and 13 African). Figure 3 shows the 
relationship between HIV prevalence (LogHIV) and this measure of trust. The correlation is 
perhaps not impressive, but it is clearly there (R2 adjusted = -0.29, just above significance at 
the 5 per cent level).  
How does the trust variable behave when inserted into a regression analysis (while 
acknowledging small sample size and possible reverse causality bias)? Table 4 reports the 
results. When “trust” is inserted into the basic model from Section 4 of this paper, its beta 
coefficient has the expected sign (negative) and is close to significant at the 5 per cent level. 
But the insertion of social capital just slightly reduces the beta coefficient of the Gini variable, 
which would indicate two independent effects. When a dummy for Africa is included, the 
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for Latin America is also included (Latin America is an outlier continent in terms of inequality  
and trust), and both inequality and trust reach significant levels again.  
FIGURE 3 
Source: See Annex 1. 
 
A number of caveats should be noted here. The sample size is small; it is unknown if the 
right dimension of social capital is being measured; and the reverse causality bias has not been 
addressed. A cautious conclusion from this analysis is that at least the data do not clearly 
contradict the sociologist’s story on the income inequality-HIV link. Social capital should be 
kept on the list of suspects.   
What path might future research take to ensure more stringent testing of the inequality-
social capital-HIV hypothesis? Ideally, larger samples and access to a wider range of indicators 
of social capital should be available, in addition to instrumental variables or time series data to 
address the issue of direction of causality.  
One option would be to break down HIV prevalence figures to African provinces and then 
combine those with data from Afrobarometer. The latter contains a wide range of indicators, 
including those on various dimensions of social capital. Some exploratory attempts have been 
made in this direction while preparing this study, reaching a sample of some 150 African 
provinces, but the results are not ready to be reported yet.    16  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE 4 
Regression Results, Social Capital/Trust Added to Basic Model  
(significant beta coefficients in bold; t-value below) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable LOGHIV 
1 2 3  4  5 
         
Gini  0.30 0.28    0.23 0.297 
   2.23  2.19    2.44 2.987 
Trust    -0.23  -0.26  -0.15  -0.188 
     1.87  -1.95  -1.65  -2.053 
logGDP/cap  0.04 -0.02 0.02  -0.09 -0.089 
   -0.28  -0.16  0.12 -1.01  -1.001 
Adult literacy  -0.33  -0.43 -0.46  -0.16 -0.132 
    -1.54 -2.06 -2.08 -0.09  -0.735 
Urban growth  0.43 0.39 0.46  0.02 -0.039 
    2.68 2.44 2.78  0.16 -0.294 
% Muslim  -0.26  -0.30 -0.33  -0.26  -0.35 
    -1.50 -1.78 -1.82 -2.13  -2.676 
SSA dummy       0.82  0.599 
       5.33 2.969 
LAC dummy        -0.267 
          -1.672 
R2  0.45 0.73 0.42  0.73  0.75 
F-value  6.78 6.69 6.31 15.03 14.31 
N=  36 36 36  36  36.00 
 
5.3  THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST’S STORY: INCOME INEQUALITY LEADING TO HIV 
THROUGH POOR PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE 
The literature frequently discusses the link between inequality and health. Inequality is 
associated with lower tax revenue and hence lower public expenditures, and possibly  
also their quality, since their distribution is sub-optimised. One hypothesis could be that an 
inequality-health link operates through a weakened public sector performance in delivering 
social services. See Kawachi et al. (1999) and Kaplan et al. (1996) for a discussion of this 
mechanism in relation to the more general income inequality-health link. 
TABLE 5 
Partial Correlations between HIV Prevalence and Various Health Sector Performance Indicators in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (significant correlations at the 5% level in bold) 
Health sector  
performance indicator 
Partial correlation  
with HIV prevalence 
N 
Immunisation rate measles  +0.18  38 SSA only 
Immunisation tuberculosis  +0.28  38 SSA only 
Child mortality (<5)  -0.33  38 SSA only 
Public health expenditures  +0.65  38 SSA only 
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Does this story also fit the pattern of HIV? For instance, a weak public health system might 
be less able to organise efficient HIV testing, to treat STDs, and to manage successful public 
awareness campaigns, all of which are believed to be important in counteracting the spread  
of HIV. If this were the case, one would expect HIV to follow a pattern similar to that of other 
health indicators whose links to public sector performance are less disputed. Immunisation  
or child mortality could be cases for comparison. Table 5 gives the partial correlations between 
HIV prevalence and four health system indicators in Africa: child mortality (<5 years), public 
health expenditures per capita, and immunisation rates for measles and tuberculosis. However, 
the table shows that all the signs are the opposite of what would be expected in the political 
economist’s story. African countries with high HIV prevalence tend to have lower child 
mortality (despite the fact that HIV itself increases child mortality), better immunisation 
programmes and higher public spending on health (though the latter circumstance could also 
be an effect of the HIV epidemic itself). It seems difficult to reconcile the correlations revealed 
by Table 5 with the political economist’s story.  
Rather than following the pattern of health system performance indicators, HIV 
prevalence seems to follow the pattern of “social diseases” such as crime and homicide rates. 
Table 6 shows the correlation between HIV prevalence and indicators of crime and homicide 
rates in Africa (and also for a global sample as regards homicide rates). Here the correlations 
are all positive and surprisingly strong. In fact, replacing HIV prevalence with the homicide rate 
as the independent variable in the basic model in Table A2 gives a strikingly similar result; the 
Gini coefficient and  the percentage of Muslims in the population emerge as the only 
significant variables. Future research could explore how the tools and approaches developed 
in criminology might be applied to research on HIV. The economics of crime and social 
capital/social disorganisation are two theories that compete to explain the established link 
between economic inequality and crime (Holmqvist, 2000). 
TABLE 6 
Partial Correlations between HIV Prevalence and Indicators of Crime/Violence  
(significant correlations at the 5% level in bold) 
Crime indicator  
with HIV prevalence 
Partial correlation  N 
Homicide rate/100,000  0.31  102 (global sample) 
Homicide rate/100,000  0.61  26 (SSA only) 
Crime rate  0.79  22 (SSA only) 
Source: See Annex 1. 
5.4   THE HISTORIAN’S STORY: HISTORY AND THE COLONIAL LEGACY,  
LEADING TO BOTH INEQUALITY AND HIV, HAVE CREATED A SPURIOUS LINK 
Could the relationship between crime and economic inequality be spurious? Poverty and/or 
urbanisation could be suspected of creating such a spurious link, but the results in Sections 3 
and 4 did not support that hypothesis. The main candidates for such a link are probably among 
factors related to history and the colonial legacy. Within SSA it is apparent that the countries 
most affected by HIV share some historical traits. Compared to the rest of SSA, the high-
prevalence countries in southern Africa and parts of eastern Africa had greater exposure to 
phenomena such as European settlements, apartheid, a large-scale mining industry, migration 
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values and family patterns. The greater presence of European settlers probably also 
contributed to a more limited presence of Islam (and to less circumcision). These colonial  
roots helped create dual societies and gave rise to the economic inequality that is particularly 
pronounced in these parts of Africa. In all of this it is not obvious how causal and spurious links 
may be distinguished from each other.  
The literature frequently refers to the colonial legacy as an important factor in 
understanding the geographical pattern of the HIV epidemic (Setel et al., 1999; Hargrove, 2007; 
Barnett and Whiteside, 2006; Brummer, 2002). Can an impact of the colonial legacy on HIV be 
documented statistically? It is not easy to find historical data that may be used for quantitative 
analysis, but one indicator of the colonial legacy is readily available: the year of independence 
from external domination. Within SSA, the year of independence is clearly associated with the 
degree to which European settlers were present in the country and hence with the extent  
of colonial penetration (more settlers are associated with later independence). An indicator 
was constructed for all developing nations in our sample. A zero was given to countries 
without a colonial past, or which attained independence before 1900, and a two-digit number 
corresponding to the independence year was given to the rest. Newly established states in  
the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia were categorised as lacking a colonial past.  
The independence years of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were 
defined as the point when white rule ended (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland combined with 
South Africa here, since they were largely ruled under the apartheid system in social and 
economic terms).  
TABLE 7 
Regression Results, “Year of Independence” Added to Basic Model 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable LOGHIV 
AllDev AllDEV AllDev  AllDev  SSAonly NotSSA 
1 2 3 4  5  6 
Gini  0.37 0.28 0.20 0.20  0.21  0.28 
   4.44  4.18  3.29 3.45  1.69  2.50 
Independence year    0.58    0.29 0.44 0.31 
     6.94  3.49  3.12  2.31 
logGDP/cap  0.00 -0.02 -0.08 -0.07  -0.21  0.06 
    0.03 -0.27 -1.41 -1.30  -2.05  0.42 
Adult literacy  -0.48 -0.26 -0.08 -0.07  -0.26 -0.16 
   -4.24  -2.75  -0.83 -0.75  -1.49  -1.00 
Urban  growth  0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08  0.04  -0.21 
    1.05 -0.78 -0.25 -1.06  0.40  -1.39 
% Muslim  -0.43 -0.45 -0.38 -0.40  -0.62 -0.59 
    4.85 -6.24 -5.90 -6.58  -3.91  -5.07 
SSA dummy      0.73  0.55     
       9.01 6.00     
R2 0.48  0.67  0.73 0.77  0.64  0.37 
F-value 17.75  31.00  42.29 42.80 10.867  6.45 
N=  90(=AllDev)  90 (=AllDev)  90 (=AllDev)  90 (=AllDev)  33 (=SSAonly)  56 (=notSSA)
 
Table 7 gives the results following the inclusion of this indicator in the basic model. It 
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most surprisingly, also for a sample consisting only of non-African countries. The indicator 
tends to reduce the beta coefficient of the Gini variable somewhat, and substantially reduces 
the coefficient of the SSA dummy.  
The results given in Table 7 indicate that historical factors related to the colonial legacy 
might be important determinants of today’s geographical pattern of HIV. A hypothesis could 
be that prolonged rule by foreign elites created inequalities, disrupted the social fabric of a 
society and undermined its ability for collective action. Further research might document this 
more solidly, and might identify more precise indicators than the one used here.  
Nonetheless, even if colonial-legacy factors seem to be associated with both economic 
inequality and HIV, there is still nothing in Table 7 to support the argument that this is a case of 
a spurious link. The historian’s story might be half-true, but the claim that the link is spurious 
would need far more solid evidence. 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper sprang from two questions: (i) is there a significant and robust link between  
income inequality and HIV? and (ii) if there is such a link, why should unequal societies  
be more vulnerable to HIV? 
The answer to the first question was in the affirmative; the link is there. It is confirmed 
consistently by a number of studies, as shown by the meta-study. The cross-country regression 
results in this paper have provided further support for the existence of such a link.  
It has not been possible, however, to answer the second question conclusively.  
Four different hypotheses have been presented as to why a link between income inequality 
and HIV might be expected: (i) the economics of sexual behaviour; (ii) social capital; (iii) public 
sector performance; and (iv) history and the colonial legacy creating a spurious relationship.  
Figure 4 gives an overview of the different pathways at play, and the position of these four 
hypotheses (the bolded boxes) in relation to them. 
The right-hand side of Figure 4 illustrates that any factor with an impact on HIV 
prevalence would work at some point through sexual or possibly non-sexual transmission  
(two boxes are labelled accordingly). Biological cofactors may affect the ”transmission rate” 
(male circumcision, untreated STDs and so forth).  
The lines leading from the ”feedback” box in the upper-right corner illustrate the various 
reverse causality mechanisms mentioned in the text. Rising HIV prevalence might have 
feedback effects in terms of AIDS mortality (reducing prevalence), more or less spontaneous 
behavioural adaptations, various kinds of public health interventions, and a number of other 
possible repercussions on society as a whole, including altered social relations that affect social 
capital. The determinants of HIV prevalence discussed here may affect the initial conditions 
that make a society vulnerable to HIV, as well as its ability to adapt once the epidemic becomes 
apparent (that is, influencing the force of the feedback mechanisms). It should be noted  
that linear regression analysis might not always capture the complexities and dynamics that 
Figure 4 attempts to illustrate. 
Confronting the four hypotheses with some preliminary empirical evidence, there is no 
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of public sector performance. In SSA, at least, HIV tends to be associated with a comparatively 
better public health performance rather than a poorer one, which is what that hypothesis 
would predict. 
As regards the other hypotheses, there is some empirical evidence to support them but it 
is not conclusive and we cannot determine their respective weight. Income inequality seems 
to be associated with riskier sexual behaviour, as the economics of sexual behaviour would 
predict. Income inequality is also associated with lower levels of social capital, and social 
capital seems to be negatively associated with HIV, as predicted by the social capital 
hypothesis. It has also been possible to show that even such a crude indicator of history and 
the colonial legacy as “year of independence” is a strong determinant of the variation in HIV 
prevalence today, globally as well as within Africa. The existence of this colonial legacy factor, 
however, is far from enough to underpin a claim that the income inequality-HIV link is 
spurious. The economics of sexual behaviour and social capital theory, apparently, remain our 
two main suspects. The paper has indicated some ideas for future research that could help 
clarify the matter further. 
Is the issue relevant enough to merit additional research? Simply knowing that there is a 
statistical link between income inequality and HIV is not something that might lend itself to 
clear policy conclusions. If we can show more precisely how this link works, however, more 
useful policy conclusions may follow. Beyond the HIV epidemic itself, there is also an interest  
in understanding why highly unequal societies should be more vulnerable to new infectious 
diseases of this kind, in which the epidemiology has strong ingredients of human behaviour 
and social relations. If it is correct to say that we will see more of these diseases in the future,  
as a by-product of globalisation and human mobility, then there is a need for a better 
understanding of these mechanisms. 
FIGURE 4 
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ANNEX 1. DATA, SOURCES, SAMPLE 
DATA AND SOURCES 
 
HIV 




Downloaded from William Easterly’s dataset, used to explain the impact of income inequality 
on growth. Easterly’s data are from WIDER (2000), but have been improved by adjusting for 
possible methodological biases. They are averages for the period 1960–1998, to the extent that 
data are available. As a sufficiently large Africa sample is essential for this study, Easterly’s 
dataset has been complemented with a few additional countries now available in the WIDER 








1995–2005. UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
 
Urban growth 






Poverty < 1 USD 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Female/male literacy 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Gender empowerment index 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 22  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
HDI-GDI rank 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Contraceptive use, married women 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
Easterly 2007: http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly/Research.html. 
 
Age of epidemic 
Year of first reported AIDS case. World Bank (1997). Confronting AIDS, Statistical Appendix, 
Table 2: http://www.worldbank.org/aids-econ/confront/confrontfull/tables.html. 
 
Male circumcision 
MC1: Drain (2006): http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2334-6-172.pdf. 
MC2: Williams et al. (2006): http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-
document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030262. 
 
High risk sex 




Demographic Health Surveys provided by USAID, downloaded from: 
http://www.measuredhs.com/. 
 
Young having premarital sex last year 




Demographic Health Surveys provided by USAID, downloaded from: 
http://www.measuredhs.com/. 
 
Female commercial sex workers 
Vandepitte et al. (2006): http://sti.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/82/suppl_3/iii18. Working Paper  23 
 
Had commercial sex last year 




Globalbarometer with links: http://www.globalbarometer.net/objectives.htm. 
 
Immunisation rates measles 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Immunisation rate Tuberculosis 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Child mortality < 5 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Public health expenditures 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Homicide rates/100.000 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
 
Crime rate SSA 
Indicator constructed from classification of African countries in five categories according to 
assessed crime rate. UNODC (2005): http://www.unodc.org/pdf/African_report.pdf. 
 
Independence year 
Adjustments made as explained in the main text. Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_Day. 
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Costa Rica  Papua New Guinea 
Côte d'Ivoire  Paraguay 
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ANNEX 2. A SKETCH OF AN INCOME INEQUALITY-SEXUAL RISK 
BEHAVIOUR MODEL  
Let an individual maximise the following utility function over two periods: 
U= U1 (Y1, p)+m(y)(1-rp)U2 (Y2, q)  (1) 
 
with 
   Y 1= y + tp  




U  =   total utility 
U1 =   utility period 1 
U2 =   utility period 2 
p  =   number of “transactional sex” partners period 1 
q  =   number of “transactional sex” partners period 2 (not of interest here) 
Y1
 =   total income period 1 
Y2
  =   total income period 2 
y   =   income excluding cost/income from transactional sex, assumed to be the same 
both   periods 
t   =  a fixed monetary cost/income of engaging in transactional sex (some 
individuals sell, others buy, with t negative for buyers and positive for sellers) 
m(y)  =  non HIV-related expectancy to survive to period 2 (supposed to be increasing 
with income) 
r  =  risk of contaminating HIV from an additional transaction sex partner, 
contamination assumed to lead to non-survival period 2. 
 
Standard properties of the utility function are assumed (second-order partials negative, 
cross partials zero or negligible, no corner solution). The individual will choose the number  
of transactional sex partners in period 1 that satisfies—that is, equation (1) differentiated  
with respect to p: 
tU1
Y + U1
p –m(y) r U2
 = 0   => p*  (2) 
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Differentiating (2) with respect to income y gives: 
tU1
Yy + U1
ppdp/dy –[rU2dm/dy + m(y)rU2
y] = 0  (3) 
or 





rich  buyer  (t<0):  + + -  - 
poor seller (t>0):  +  +  +  -    
 
The poor “seller” of transactional sex will unambiguously reduce the number of partners 
with increasing income (dp/dy <0): increased income means higher expected non HIV-related 
survival (dm/dy >0) and increased utility period 2 (U2
y>0), and hence less willingness to take 
the risk of being infected. Increased income also reduces the marginal utility of the additional 
income derived from transactional sex (tU1
Yy<0).  
For a “buyer”, the value of dp/dy depends on a trade-off: higher income means higher 
expected survival and a greater utility period 2, and hence less willingness to take the risk of 
being infected and not surviving. But being richer also means that the marginal utility loss 
from paying “t” is lower—that is, transactional sex becomes more affordable. If the latter effect 
dominates, increasing income means more “buyers”. 
Higher income inequality means that there will be more of both rich and poor people,  
so there will be more potential sellers of transactional sex, and possibly also more buyers. 
Adding a price mechanism (that is, let “t” be a function of supply and demand so that price 
goes down as more sellers enter the market) would reinforce the basic point of this model 
further, as demand from rich “buyers” would react to the price effect.   
ANNEX 3 
TABLE A1 
          
Study (author/journal)  Main theme  Sample  Independent 
variable 
Explanatory variables  
(“significant” in bold) 
General remarks and specific findings concerning 
income inequality 
  






Logit HIV  
=ln[hiv/(C-hiv)] 
Inequality/Gini (+)  *Income inequality remains robust for various tests, such as  
using instrument for GNI/cap, allowing for interaction variables,  
making HIV binary, etc. It is estimated that income inequality 
adds 30% explicative power to the model. 
PhD dissertation, 
University d’Auvergne 
Female economic participation 
HIV and gender 
inequality 
  Female/male school enrolm. (-) 
    Maternal leave benefits 
        Log GNI/cap  *The HIV-inequality link is not explicitly tested but some potential  
transmission mechanisms mentioned (such as material deprivation,  
psychosocial, social cohesion). 
       Poverty(water+malnutrition) (-) 
        Access to healthcare 
        Adult literacy (+)  *Some but not all gender variables shown to be robust. 
       Muslim % (+)  *Most results, including on income inequality, also remain significant when, 
in a smaller sample, HIV prevalence rate is replaced by HIV incidence.         Ethnic fractionalisation (+) 
        Log TV sets (-) 
       Contraceptive prevalence (-)     
       Urbanisation  rate     
       Conflict     
        Voice and accountability     
       Southern/Eastern Africa (+)     
        Prevalence border country     
            




LOG HIV  Inequality/GINI (+)  Median age for first sex is tested in a smaller sample (45 countries) and is 
significant as an explanatory variable. In this sample and model 
specification, the Gini variable loses its significance. 
AIDS Care    LogGNI/cap  (PPP) 
       Adult literacy (+) 
       Urban  % 
        Age of epidemic     
       Muslim % (+)     
       Southern Africa (+)     
       Contraceptive  use     
       Cofactor infections (STI,     
       parasites, etc.) (+)     
       Age first sex females (-)      
Broody/Deuchert (2007)  HIV and unsafe 
healthcare 
Global 
54 develop.  
countries 
HIV prevalence  Inequality/Gini (+)  *Non-use of autodisable syringes significantly related to HIV, indicating 
transmission through unsafe healthcare.  Annals of  
Epidemiology 
  GDP per capita 
   Health  expenditures 
        Literacy  *In a SSA-only sample tetanus immunisation coverage 
is also significantly and positively related to HIV, also 
indicating healthcare transmission. 
       Vaccination 
       Physicians/cap 
       Urban share (-)     
       Muslim %     
       Female/male  literacy     
       Female economic activity (-)     
        Age of epidemic     
       SSA dummy (+)     
       LAC dummy (-)     
       Asia  dummy     
       Eastern  Europe  dummy     
       No-use autodisable syringe (+)     
            




HIV prevalence  Inequality/Gini (+)  *Inequality robust for all model specifications.   
PLoS ONE    Female illiteracy rate (-)  *Significance of “Muslim” not robust for inclusion of commercial sex worker. 
       Muslim % (+) 
       Commercial sex workers (+)   
       GDP/capita    
            
Drain et al. (2006)  HIV determinants  Global 
122 devel. 
countries 
LOG HIV  Examine 81 different socioeconomic 
variables 
Unclear methodology.   
Epidemiology and      Not reported how inequality was used in multivariate model, but reported as 
significant correlate in bivariate analysis.  Social Science      Strong predictors were: 
       Male circumcision (-) 
       Regional dummies     
       Female illiteracy (-)     
       Age structure (+)     
       Immunisation (-)   
       Age of epidemic (+)     
             
 
Gray (2003)  HIV and Islam  SSA 
38 countries 
HIV prevalence  Muslim % (+)  Also contain meta-study of findings on Islam and HIV, where all but one 
reporting Islam leading to less HIV.  Soc Science and      GDP/cap (+) 
Medicine        Population density  Potential pathways indicated as male circumcision, restrictive norms on 
alcohol and marital codes.          Urban  % 
        Age of epidemic  Ambiguous evidence of Islam being related to less risky sexual behaviour. 
        
            






HIV prevalence  Population density  High female mortality in 1980s negatively related to HIV prevalence. Good 
healthcare leading to reduced mortality could increase prevalence, claimed to 
explain why richer African countries have higher prevalence. 
Univ. of California 
Working Paper  
  Road network 1990 
   GDP/cap 
     Female mortality 1980 (-) 
            




  Inequality urban/rural (+)  The inequality variable remains robust for inclusion of a set of 15 different 
explanatory variables (details not given).  Nottingham University 
Conference Paper 
 Female  literacy 
      Various others (not reported) 
            
Crosby and Holtgrave 
(2003) 
HIV income  




AIDS case rate  Inequality richest/poorest  deciles 
(+) 
   
   
Sexually Transmitted      Social capital (index of 14  
measures) (-) 
   
Infections, STI online          
       Poverty     
            






HIV prevalence  GDP/capita  No income inequality measure used.   
  Mobility/number of cars (+)     
Int. Journal of Health       Urbanisation (+)     
Geographics       Teenage crime (+)     
       Healthcare/hospital  beds     
       Far East dummy (+)     
            




HIV prevalence  Inequality/Gini (+)     
World Health and    GDP/cap     
Population       Gender development index (-)     
       Good  governance      
TABLE A2 
Dependent variable: LOGHIV 
Table report standardised regression coefficients with t-statistics below. Significance at 5% level in bold.        
Round  Sample






























1–5 Base model                          
1 AllDev  0.36  0.00 -0.48 0.11 -0.43           17.75  0.482 
  n=90  4.44  0.03 -4.24 1.05 -4.85              
                          
2 AllDev  0.20  -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.38 0.73         42.29  0.734 
  n=90  3.29  -1.41 -0.83 -0.25 -5.90 9.01            
                          
3 SSA  0.34  -0.22 -0.89 0.10 0.67           8.46  0.531 
  n=33  2.58  -1.81 -0.46 0.79 -3.72              
              S. Afr. dummy           
4 SSA  0.22  -0.16 -0.18 0.04 -0.57 0.40         10.541  0.634 
  n=33  1.82  -1.44 -1.05 0.31 -3.54 2.99            
                          
5 NotSSA  0.24  0.05 -0.30 -0.18 -0.53           6.145  0.315 
  n=56  2.06  0.32 -2.00 -1.17 -4.50              
                          
6–9 Alternative poverty indicators          Poverty  <1USD        
6 AllDev  0.40  -0.04  0.14 -0.23   0.38        19.129  0.525 
 n=82  4.66  -4.86   1.34 -2.85   3.76            
                           
7 AllDev  0.26  -0.08  -0.17 -0.31 0.76 -0.02        41.374  0.747 
 n=82  4.03  -1.36   -0.22 -5.18 8.28 -0.26            
                           
8 SSA  0.40  -0.13  0.02 -0.56  -0.04         5.796  0.48 
 n=26  2.72  -0.87   0.12 -3.77   -0.30            
              S. Afr. dummy           
9 SSA  0.16  -0.05   -0.06 -0.27 0.65 0.03        14.838  0.762 
 n=26  1.44  -0.47   -0.58 -2.37 5.08 0.32             
10–18 Gender inequality              Female/male  literacy        
10 AllDev  0.42  -0.03   0.20 -0.39    -0.33      14.996  0.449 
 n=86  4.76  -0.31   2.02 -4.09     -3.07          
                            
11 AllDev  0.22  -0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.36 0.71  0.06       34.19  0.73 
 n=86  3.41  -1.47 -0.70 -0.48 -5.39 8.71   0.40          
                            
12 AllDev  0.39  -0.01 -0.55 0.08 -0.40    0.11       14.087  0.477 
 n=86  4.44  -1.03 -2.33 0.70 -4.36     0.51          
                            
                  Gender empowerment index      
13 AllDev  0.39  0.27 -0.36 0.06 -0.30    0.08       6.261  0.407 
 n=46  2.89  1.98 1.99 0.34 -1.85     0.50          
                            
14 AllDev  0.30  0.11 -0.14 0.03 -0.28 0.44  0.04       8.34  0.528 
 n=46  2.41  0.83 -0.79 0.23 -0.20 3.35   0.31          
                            
                 HDI-GDI  rank        
15 AllDev  0.39  0.00 -0.50 0.08 -0.42    0.04       13.347  0.47 
 n=85  4.51  0.04 -3.97 0.73 -4.36     0.53          
                            
16 AllDev  0.23  -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.38 0.73  -0.01       33.83  0.73 
 n=85  3.62  -1.28 -0.91 -0.52 -5.55 8.85   -0.12          
                            
                  Contraceptive use married women    
17 AllDev  0.37  -0.02 -0.15 0.07 -0.44    -0.45      18.856  0.555 
 n=86  4.82  -0.30 -1.13 0.70 -5.20     -3.77          
                            
18 AllDev  0.21  -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.38 0.69  -0.08      35.283  0.736 
 n=86  3.25  -1.46 -0.33 -0.08 -5.80 7.49   -0.74          
                            
19–21 Ethnic fractionalisation                          
19 AllDev  0.32  -0.01 -0.40 0.09 -0.43      0.18    12.426  0.449 
 n=84  3.73  -0.08 -3.16 0.78 -4.56       2.03        
                             
20 AllDev  0.20  -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.39 0.73    -0.01    28.893  0.699 
 n=84  3.03  -1.45 -0.65 -0.36 -5.53 8.11     -0.11        
                            
21 SSA  0.34 -0.29 -0.05 0.10 -0.60      -0.19     5.824  0.55 
 n=27  2.26  -2.10 -0.21 0.66 -2.94       -1.28        
                            
22–24 Age of epidemic                          
22 AllDev  0.35  -0.19 -0.10 0.12 -0.63        -0.18   6.955  0.438 
 n=84  2.59  -1.48 -0.50 0.93 -3.18         -1.30      
                            
23 AllDev  0.16  -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.39 0.74      -0.03   30.428  0.71 
 n=84  2.55  -1.53 -0.73 -0.19 -5.24 8.62       -0.40      
                            
24–28 Male circumcision                       
24 AllDev  0.37  0.00 -0.48 0.11 -0.39          -0.06 14.682  0.477 
 n=90  4.40  0.05 -4.24 1.09 -2.93           -0.43    
                            
25 AllDev  0.23  -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.83        -0.36 45.022 0.774 
 n=90  4.06  -1.53 -0.39 -0.09 -1.06 10.55         -4.00    
                            
26 AllDev  0.24  -0.08 0.00 0.00   0.85        -0.43 52.264 0.774 
 n=90  4.33  -1.52 0.01 -0.02   11.40         -7.47    
                            
27 SSA  0.34  -0.22 -0.09 0.10 -0.67            8.462  0.531 
 n=33  2.58  -1.81 -0.46 0.79 -3.72                
                            
28 SSA  0.37  -0.19 -0.11 -0.02 -0.51          -0.37 11.644 0.67 
 n=33  3.16  -1.87 -0.66 -0.15 -3.11           -2.78    
 
Data sources: See Annex 1. 
Software: SPSS 16.0.  
1. AllDev = All developing countries with data available; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; NotSSA = All developing countries excluding SSA.  
2. Dummy is for SSA countries except in SSA-only equations, where it refer to countries in southern Africa, as indicated.  
3. Note difference in male circumcision indicator for SSA-only sample; see main text and Annex 1. 
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1. The usefulness of cross-country analysis, however, should not be overestimated. It has clear limitations, in 
particular as regards guiding interventions. 
2. The log transformation is rarely given a theoretical justification in the literature. Its impact is to improve the 
statistical properties of the variable, “flattening out” the outliers.  
3. In the literature on income inequality and health, an additional transmission mechanism often discussed is the 
psychosocial one (that is, negative health effects from feelings of stress and alienation in an unequal society).  
This transmission mechanism seems less plausible with regard to HIV and has not been included here.  
4. To address the direction of causality, male circumcision was used as an instrument for HIV prevalence. But the 
validity of male circumcision as an instrument is doubtful because it is likely to correlate with country or cultural 
characteristics. See Glick (2007: 29). International
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